

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] 25X1

ACIS - 360/98
17 July 1988

*I think you
evaluation of
to monitor
(p2) is excellent
information*

NOTE FOR: DDCI

--EYES ONLY--

FROM: [redacted] 25X1

DC/ACIS

SUBJECT: Comments on Compartmented NSC Papers

Attached FYI are three compartmented NSC prepared papers and our comments on them. We are likely to see additional iterations of the papers.

In addition, the NSC has asked that I provide, in this compartment, a stand-alone intelligence paper looking at what the Soviets may do on arms control negotiations over the next few months. I am drawing on the appropriate offices and NIO's expertise.

We will drop a copy to you early next week.

Please call ACIS, [redacted] to [redacted] 25X1
return this document. 25X1

Attachment:
As stated

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] 25X1

Page Denied

[REDACTED]
ACIS - 356/87

16 July 1987

Copy 2 of 4

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert Linhard
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

FROM:

[REDACTED]
DCI Representative
Arms Control Support Group

SUBJECT: Comments on GRIP Papers

25X1

1. Our specific comments on GRIP 21A, 22A, and 23A are noted below. We have modified the monitoring language on GRIP 22A to reflect refinements in our judgments and provided a suggested statement that gives a lean-forward perspective of what might be done in a proactive approach. In addition, I suggest a few short inserts, meant to provide senior officers an understanding of the Soviet concerns behind particular Soviet positions (mobile missiles testing in space, etc.). The inserts could help give direction to other approaches, if a proactive position is considered. Finally, I have some strong comments on the Backfire/SLCM option. [REDACTED]

25X1

2. GRIP 21A, page three:

Suggested additional statement to Mobile ICBM Discussion.

The Soviets almost certainly will not give up mobile ICBMs. Only with major concessions on MX/D5 might they even consider such an action. They believe these weapons are necessary to offset the advantages they perceive in US high accuracy, high technology weapons and mobility across the triad. They see the mobile missile ban as an effort to force them to restructure their forces. Further, they recognize that accepting a ban on mobile ICBMs would push them to a sea-based force where the US retains an advantage. [REDACTED]

25X1

3. GRIP 21A, page five-six:

SLCMs Options:

Add the following statement on page 6. The Backfire is an intermediate bomber with major theater responsibilities. It has only marginal capability against the US (as do all intermediate bombers). The Backfire could be useful as a throw-away in negotiations. [REDACTED]

25X1

The IC unanimously agrees that the Backfire is an intermediate-range bomber. There is no evidence that the Soviets have conducted intercontinental attack training or in-flight refueling for SAF or SNA Backfire units, or have

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]
SECRET